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I. INTRODUCTION 
The annexation of Texas was by any standard a pivotal 
moment in the political history of the United States. The deci-
sion to add Texas to the Union was either directly or indirectly 
responsible for the acquisition of all of the territory of the 
United States south and west of the Louisiana Purchase. An-
nexation was also a critical issue in the presidential election of 
1844 and the more general political struggle between Whigs and 
Democrats. Moreover, the dispute over Texas was a flashpoint 
in the evolving sectional conflict between the representatives of 
the free states and slave states.' 
The discussions of the issue in Congress had a dual aspect. 
Many of the arguments both for and against annexation were 
overtly phrased in terms of expediency. In addition, however, 
the debate over Texas had an important constitutional dimen-
sion, raising fundamental questions about the structure of the 
nation. These constitutional issues have never been adequately 
addressed by the commentators. 
This article will provide a compact but complete analysis of 
the constitutional aspects of the struggle over Texas. The article 
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will begin by briefly describing the political background of the 
dispute over annexation. It will then discuss the place of the con-
stitutional arguments in the efforts to annex Texas by treaty. The 
article will then describe and evaluate the constitutional objec-
tions to admitting Texas directly as a state by statute, without the 
benefit of a treaty. Finally, the article will assess the significance 
of the constitutional debates more generally. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The sequence of events that led to the annexation and ad-
mission of Texas can be traced to the Adams-Onis Treaty of 
1819, in which the United States renounced its claims to Texas 
and the Spanish government agreed to sell Florida to the United 
States. Subsequently, the administrations of both John Quincy 
Adams and Andrew Jackson made efforts to purchase Texas. 
However, the Mexican government rebuffed these overtures. 
The situation became more complex after Texas declared its in-
dependence from Mexico in 1836. Even before its official recog-
nition of the Republic of Texas by the Jackson administration, 
the government of Texas evinced a desire to join the United 
States. The reaction to these overtures was divided largely along 
sectional lines, with many Southern Democrats pressing hard for 
annexation and antislavery Northerners equally vehement in 
their opposition.Against this background, for a variety of rea-
sons, neither Jackson nor Martin Van Buren made any effort to 
effectuate annexation. 2 
The presidential election of 1840 set in motion a series of 
events that brought the issue of Texas to center stage in national 
politics. The Whig party nominated William Henry Harrison as 
the party standard bearer in the election. Seeking to strengthen 
Harrison's appeal in the South, convention delegates then se-
lected John Tyler of Virginia to be his running mate. The Whig 
ticket was elected, and when Harrison died soon after his inau-
guration, Tyler succeeded to the presidency in 1841. Dubbed 
"His Accidency" by contemporaries, Tyler soon quarreled with 
his Whig compatriots and was excommunicated from the party, 
effectively becoming a President with no constituency in either 
national political party. Tyler pursued annexation with an enthu-
siasm that stemmed in part from a desire to use the issue to ere-
2. The background for the decision not to pursue the annexation of Texas during 
this period is discussed in SMITH, supra note 1, at 63--68. 
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ate an independent power base for his administration. His repre-
sentatives successfully negotiated a treaty which provided that 
Texas would be annexed to the United States and, at least ini-
tially, would be treated as one of its territories. The treaty of an-
nexation was submitted to the Senate for ratification on April 
22, 1844.3 
The submission of the treaty set off an intense political 
struggle over ratification. In America, such struggles are often 
cast not only as debates over expediency, but also in constitu-
tional terms. The debate over Texas was no exception. The con-
stitutional issues raised by the discussions posed fundamental 
questions about the nature of the Union and the circumstances 
under which it could be legitimately expanded. 
III. THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE TREATY 
The contours of the debate over the ratification of the treaty 
to annex Texas had been largely foreshadowed by the political 
controversy that had been generated by the Louisiana Purchase 
in 1803. During the debate over Louisiana, some Federalists ar-
gued that the addition of such an immense territory would strain 
the bonds that held the Union together. For example, Senator 
William White of Delaware complained that: 
[O]ur citizens will be removed to the immense distance of two 
or three thousand miles from the capital of the Union, where 
they will scarcely ever feel the rays of the General Govern-
ment; their affections will become alienated; they will gradu-
ally begin to view us as strangers; they will form other com-
mercial connexions [sic], and our interests will become 
distinct. 4 
New England Federalists were particularly alarmed because 
they believed that the eventual admission of states carved from 
Louisiana would enhance the political strength of the agrarian 
forces of the South and West, to the detriment of the mercantile 
interests that predominated in New England. The distress of 
New Englanders was exacerbated by the impact that the three-
fifths clause would have on the potential representation of any 
3. !d. ch VIII. 
4. 8 ANNALS OF CO !'I G. 34 (1803). 
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slave_ states that might be created in the newly-acquired terri-
tory.) 
Animated by concerns such as these, Federalists such as 
Senator Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts and Senator Uriah 
Tracy of Connecticut argued that Jefferson had exceeded his 
constitutional authority by entering into the treaty that conveyed 
Louisiana to the United States.6 Lacking explicit textual author-
ity to acquire territory, Jefferson himself had expressed doubts 
about the constitutionality of adding such a vast territory by 
treaty. Supporters of the treaty, however, adopted the position 
that was elaborated by Senator John Taylor of Virginia: 
Before a confederation, each State in the Union possessed a 
right, as attached to sovereignty, of acquiring territory, by 
war, purchase, or treaty. This right must be either still pos-
sessed, or forbidden both to each State and to the General 
Government, or transferred to the General government. It is 
not possessed by the States separately, because war and com-
pacts with foreign Powers and with each other are prohibited 
to a separate State; and no other means of acquiring territory 
exist. ... Neither the means nor the right of acquiring terri-
tory are forbidden to the United States; on the contrary, in 
the fourth article of the Constitution, Congress is empowered 
"to dispose of and regulate the territory belonging to the 
United States." This recognises [sic] the right of the United 
States to hold territory. The means of acquiring territory con-
sist of war and compact .... [B]eing both given to the United 
States, and prohibited to each State, it follows that these at-
tributes of sovereignty once held by each State are thus trans-
ferred to the United States, and that, if the means of acquiring 
and the right of holding, are equivalent to the right of acquir-
ing territory, then this right merged from the separate States 
to the United States, as indispensably annexed to the treaty-
making power, and the power of making war; or, indeed, is 
literally given to the General Government by the Constitu-
tion.7 
Pickering and Tracy attacked the constitutionality of the 
treaty on narrower grounds. They conceded that the federal 
government had the power to acquire Louisiana and to rule it as 
a "dependent province."8 Their objection was based on the 
5. /d. at 56. 
6. /d. at 44-45 (statement of Sen. Pickering); id. at 53-58 (statement of Sen. 
Tracy). 
7. /d. at 50. 
8. /d. at 45. 
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clause of the treaty that provided that "[t)he inhabitants of [Lou-
isiana] shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, 
and admitted, as soon as possible, according to the principles of 
the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, ad-
vantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States."9 They 
contended that this provision required the federal government to 
eventually admit new states from the newly-acquired territory, 
and that such a commitment was not within the purview of the 
treaty-making power. 10 Indeed, they claimed that the federal 
government had no constitutional authority to admit such 
states. 11 While Article IV, Section 3 explicitly grants Congress 
the power to admit new states, Tracy asserted that it "refers to 
domestic States only, and not at all to foreign States." 12 
Pickering went even further, contending that even an ordinary 
constitutional amendment would not suffice and that "the assent 
of each individual State [is] necessary for the admission of a for-
eign country as an associate in the Union: in like manner as in a 
commercial house, the consent of each member would be neces-
sary to admit a new partner into the company." 13 Supporters of 
the treaty did not respond directly to this analysis of the consti-
tutional authority to admit new states; instead, they insisted that 
the treaty required only that the inhabitants of Louisiana be rec-
ognized as citizens under a territorial government. 14 
Whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments in the 
abstract, the outcome of the debate over the ratification of the 
Louisiana treaty was foreordained by the political context in 
which the debate took place. Despite their general preference 
for a narrow interpretation of the powers of the federal govern-
ment, the dominant Jeffersonians were solidly behind the treaty. 
Even among the Federalists, opposition to the treaty came pri-
marily from New Englanders. Thus, when the vote was taken, 
the acquisition of Louisiana was overwhelmingly approved by 
the Senate. 15 
The political cross currents surrounding the proposed an-
nexation of Texas were far more complex. Many Senate Democ-
rats rallied around the treaty. They argued that annexation was 
9. /d. at 54. 
10. !d. at 58. 
1!. /d. at 56. 
12. /d. 
13. /d.at45. 
14. /d. at 49-50. 
15. /d. at 26. 
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necessary to protect against the expansion of British influence in 
North America; that the entire nation would gain significant 
economic benefits from annexation; and that the South in par-
ticular needed protection from the abolitionist designs of the 
British and would benefit from the acquisition of a vast new ter-
ritory that would allow the "diffusion" of slaves. 16 
Treaty opponents, on the other hand, were drawn from both 
the Whig and Democratic parties. They raised a variety of dif-
ferent objections. Some of these objections reflected Whig dis-
trust of the idea of territorial expansion generally. Thus, Whig 
Representative Joseph R. Ingersoll asserted that: 
The danger of this country was that it would break to pieces 
at its extremities-these extremities being made more distant 
from the central government; which after all, was like the 
heart, from which issued and was circulated the sprin~ of life 
throughout the whole system to its farthest extremities. 7 
Ingersoll also stated the following: 
Considering the annexation of another territory to that which 
was already possessed by the nation is calculated to produce 
one disastrous result. If there were a defect more prominent 
than any other in the national character of these United 
States, it was the very want of nationality. A spirit of common 
loyalty has not been as successfully cultivated here as among 
some other nations. It would be a calamity to weaken still fur-
ther this vital principle. A nation derives strength as well as 
pride from the recollection of its heroic ancestry .... What has 
the rock of Plymouth or the settlement- the purity of the pil-
grims or the gallantry of the lover of Pocahontas-to do with 
Texas or the Rio del Norte? 18 
Other objections to the treaty focused more specifically on 
Texas itself. Treaty opponents contended that annexation would 
almost certainly lead to war with Mexico, and that the move-
ment to acquire Texas was designed to enhance the position of 
the "slave power" in the Union. This impression was reinforced 
by the Packenham Letter, in which Secretary of State John C. 
Calhoun of South Carolina, explicitly defended the treaty on the 
ground that annexation was necessary to protect the South from 
the abolitionist designs of the British. 
16. For perceptive discussions of the political crosscurrents, see MORRISON, supra 
note 1, at 20-26; SMITH, supra note 1, ch. XII. 
17. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1845). 
18. !d. app. at 56. 
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In addition to arguing that annexation was inexpedient, the 
opponents of the treaty maintained it could not constitutionally 
be adopted. Some critics noted that Mexico had never officially 
recognized the independence of Texas and argued that the an-
nexation treaty was in effect a declaration of war against Mexico 
which required the concurrence of both houses of Congress. 
Thus, Whig Senator Spencer Jarnagin of Tennessee asserted 
that: 
The President and Senate have no right to make war; they 
cannot, therefore, rightfully enter into a treaty, the direct ef-
fect of which is war, and gives to another nation a right of war 
against us, or assumes a war pending. They surely cannot do 
that which is an aggression upon another nation, as well as an 
usurpation upon our own constitution .... Texas cannot de-
liver us possession, but only the war upon the event of which 
that possession depends; so that the misnamed treaty of an-
nexation or incorporation is not such, but war under another 
name, faithlessly and unconstitutionally made. 19 
More commonly, treaty opponents made objections similar 
to those that had been leveled against Jefferson's purchase of the 
Louisiana Territory. Opponents of annexation revived the ar-
guments of the Federalists who had opposed Jefferson. Thus, 
Jarnagin contended the following: 
The constitution has given, and could give, no such authority 
as that now assumed by the treaty-making power. It is a 
strictly extra and ultra-constitutional one; for a constitution is 
an agreement between the parties to it. If it is that of a single 
society, then the parties are the body of its citizens. If it is a 
compact between several societies, forming by it a federative 
league, it is these separately who make the parties to it. In ei-
ther case, to introduce or exclude a member cannot be within 
the scope of the compact; because it would vary the parties, 
and so terminate the agreement. The terms of the instrument 
itself could in no manner bestow a power contrary to this 
condition, inherent in the contract itself, and incapable of be-
ing excluded from it. Legally to alter these, the special assent 
of each party must precede the act. 20 
Other opponents of annexation distinguished between the 
acquisition of an incorporated territory such as Louisiana and 
acquisition of a hitherto sovereign state such as Texas. John 
19. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Scss. app. at 685 (1844). 
20. !d. app. at 682. 
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Quincy Adams made this point bluntly in a resolution that he 
proposed in 1843: 
Resolved, That by the constitution of the United States no 
power is delegated to their congress, or to any department or 
departments of their government, to affix to this union any 
foreign state, or the people thereof. Resolved, That any at-
tempt of the government of the United States, by an act of 
congress or by treaty, to annex to this union the republic of 
Texas, or the people thereof, would be a violation of the con-
stitution of the United States, null and void, and to which the 
free states of this union and their people ought not to sub-
mit.2I 
Ultimately, the treaty of annexation was overwhelmingly re-
jected by the Senate. Attitudes toward the treaty broke down 
along predictable political lines. Whigs, who opposed territorial 
expansion generally, voted against ratification by a twenty-seven 
to one margin. Southern Democrats, by contrast, were almost 
equally unanimous in supporting the treaty, voting ten to one in 
support of ratification. By contrast, Northern Democrats faced a 
complex political dilemma. On one hand, Democrats generally 
supported territorial expansion, and by the time that the ratifica-
tion vote was taken, the party had adopted a platform that advo-
cated the annexation of both Texas and Oregon. However, De-
mocrats who supported the treaty risked being labeled tools of 
the Southern slaveocracy. In addition, some Northern Democ-
rats were angered by the role that annexationists had played in 
denying the party's presidential nomination to Martin Van Bu-
ren. Against this background, it should not be surprising that 
Northern Democrats split, with seven out of twelve voting to rat-
ify.22 
IV. THE ADMISSION OF TEXAS AS A STATE 
This defeat of the treaty did not end the controversy over 
Texas. Even before Senate action on the treaty, Tyler had enter-
tained the idea of having Texas admitted as a state by a joint 
resolution of Congress.23 This proposal gained momentum after 
the election of 1844. Henry Clay, the nominee of the Whig party, 
opposed immediate annexation. Martin Van Buren, the pre-
21. MERK, supra note 1, at 136. 
22. 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 312 (1844). 
23. SMITH, supra note 1, at 281. 
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convention favorite for the Democratic nomination, had taken a 
similar position. However, the Democratic nomination ulti-
mately went to James K. Polk, an ardent annexationist who 
made the issue a centerpiece of his campaign. When Polk won a 
narrow victory over Clay, annexationists claimed a popular 
mandate for their position. Although the strength of the Whigs 
in the Senate was substantially reduced in the Senate, even in the 
new Congress Democrats would be well-short of the two-thirds 
majority necessary to ratify a treaty. Thus, the idea of proceed-
ing by joint resolution was the only viable option. 
Not surprisingly, opponents of annexation raised strong 
constitutional objections to this effort. Those scholars who have 
ventured an opinion have typically been equally dubious about 
the constitutionality of admitting Texas as a state by joint resolu-
tion, rather than acquiring its territory by treaty, which would 
have required a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Thus, for ex-
ample, during his more general discussion of the joint resolution, 
Frederick Merk states flatly that this procedure "required twist-
ing, indeed wrenching, the language of the Constitution. "24 Simi-
larly, William W. Freehling suggests that "southern annexation-
ists appeared to be playing fast and loose with majoritarian rules 
[and their] disregard for any republican procedure in their way 
caused Yankees and even key Southerners to bridle at their bul-
lying."25 In fact, the claim that Texas could constitutionally be 
admitted by joint resolution was much more plausible than these 
comments would suggest. 
One objection was that Texas could not be immediately an-
nexed as a state because no Texan could meet the residency re-
quirement for service in the Senate or House of Representatives. 
The Constitution requires members of the Senate to have been 
citizens of the United States for nine years, and members of the 
House of Representatives to have been citizens for seven years. 
Opponents contended that, since Texas was a foreign country 
and had previously been a part of Mexico, residents would not 
become citizens of the United States until annexation was com-
plete. Under this view, all Texans would be ineligible to serve in 
the Senate for nine years after annexation and ineligible to serve 
in the House for seven years. In short, under this view, immedi-
ate statehood for Texas would create the anomaly of a state that 
could not be represented in Congress. 
24. MERK, supra note 1, at 139. 
25. FREEHLING, supra note 1, at 441. 
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By contrast, supporters of annexation argued that Congress 
could simply take the view that Texas had in fact become a pos-
session of the United States with the Louisiana Purchase, that it 
had not been legitimately surrendered by the Adams-Onis 
Treaty, and thus that the residents of Texas had been citizens of 
the United States since the early nineteenth century.26 Others, 
such as Whig Representative Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, 
contended that the term "citizen of the United States" should be 
interpreted to include citizenship of a state that was currently 
part of the United States, and that once Texas was annexed, the 
full amount of time that a person had been a citizen of Texas 
should count toward the constitutional requirements. 27 
In any event, the major constitutional claim of anti-
annexationists was that the use of a joint resolution usurped the 
treaty-making authority held jointly by the President and the 
Senate. On this point, both sides appealed to the original under-
standing of the Constitution. Representative Robert C. Win-
throp of Massachusetts provided one of the clearest explanations 
of the anti-annexation argument: 
[T]he constitution provide[ s] a legislative and an executive 
power, providing a treaty-making power of the executive and 
the Senate of the United States; and while such a power ex-
isted, the resolutions now [being considered by the House of 
Representatives] had no sort of right to be there. This House 
had no authority to make treaty compacts with foreign pow-
ers .... It was the doctrine of the constitution that one third of 
the States- and those might be even the smallest, might for-
bid alliances with foreign powers .... [Winthrop] knew the 
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs had omitted 
the word treaty [from the resolution], and had taken care to 
use the word "settlement," and "Texas consenting;" but it re-
lated to laws, and lands, and persons, out of our territory, and 
therefore it belonged to the treaty-making power.28 
Arguments such as these reflected a basic misunderstanding 
about the scope of the treaty-making power. In essence, Win-
throp was suggesting that the joint resolution was constitution-
ally flawed because it was designed to achieve a result that was 
properly within the treaty-making authority, while at the same 
time circumventing the requirement of ratification by two-thirds 
of the Senate. The difficulty with this argument is that any effort 
26. COI'G. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1845). 
27. ld. at 190. 
28. !d. at 95. 
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to directly admit Texas as a state of United States by treaty 
alone would itself have been clearly unconstitutional. While the 
House of Representatives has no role in considering treaties, the 
Constitution clearly requires that the House approve the admis-
sion of new states. Thus, the joint resolution was not subject to 
the objection that it trenched on the treaty-making power. 
The stronger constitutional claim was based on an appeal to 
the basic concept of enumerated powers. The argument was that 
the power to admit new states was the only conceivable source 
of authority for the joint resolution, and that this power did not 
extend to the admission of foreign sovereigns. Senator Rufus 
Choate of Massachusetts put the point bluntly: 
[U]ntil it was found [that] the treaty of last session had no 
chance of passing the Senate, no human being, save one-no 
man, woman, or child, in this Union, or out of this Union, 
wise or foolish, drunk or sober, was ever heard to breathe one 
syllable about this power in the constitution of admitting new 
States being applicable to the admission of foreign nations, 
29 governments, or states. 
Under this view, Texas could only be admitted as a state after 
having first been acquired by the United States through the me-
dium of a treaty. 
Not surprisingly, defenders of the joint resolution procedure 
had a different perspective on the constitutional issues. Some 
annexationists contended that, notwithstanding the provisions of 
the Adams-Onis Treaty, Texas was rightfully a possession of the 
United States whose title had never been validly conveyed to 
Spain. This argument was based on two premises. The first 
premise was that Texas was part of the territory that had been 
ceded to the United States in the Louisiana Purchase. The sec-
ond premise was that cession of Texas in the Adams-Onis Treaty 
was void because the federal government lacked authority to 
transfer any portion of the territory of the United States to a 
foreign government. Under this view, the admission of Texas as 
a state was in principle no different than the admission of the 
other states that had been carved out of the Louisiana Pur-
chase.30 
Opponents of admission pointed out that, if the Adams-
Onis Treaty was not valid, then Florida should be reconveyed to 
29. /d. at 304. 
30. See, e.g., id. at 158. 
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Spain. At the very least, as Representative James Belser of Ala-
~al?a observed, it wou_ld be "ver~ bad grace ... to deny the va-
lidity of the treaty [m 1845]." Representative Stephen A. 
Douglass of Illinois had an ingenious response to this argument. 
Douglass conceded that the United States was estopped from 
denying the validity of the treaty per se. At the same time, he 
noted that the treaty which effectuated the Louisiana Purchase 
provided that "the ceded territory should be admitted into our 
Union, as soon as possible." 32 Having gained their independence 
from Mexico, the people of Texas were now entitled to claim the 
benefits of this provision and demand admission into the Un-
ion.33 
However, even Douglass's solution did not meet a more 
fundamental objection to reliance on the Louisiana Purchase 
Treaty. Opponents of the joint resolution procedure argued sim-
ply that the United States' claim to Texas under this treaty was 
dubious at best, and that on this point the Adams-Onis Treaty 
did no more than confirm the status quo. Given the uncertainty 
surrounding both the original relationship of Texas to the Lou-
isiana Purchase and the claim that the government did not have 
authority to abandon that claim, supporters of the joint resolu-
tion turned to other arguments to bolster their legal claims. 
Annexationists at times contended that the precedents of 
North Carolina, Rhode Island and Vermont established the au-
thority of Congress to proceed by joint resolution. All of these 
states had been independent entities prior to being admitted to 
the Union created by the Constitution, and each was admitted 
without benefit of a treaty. The supporters of the joint resolution 
contended that the case of Texas was no different. Anti-
annexationists, however, argued that the issues presented by 
these cases were quite different from those presented by the con-
troversy over Texas. 
North Carolina and Rhode Island were the easiest prece-
dents for the opponents of the joint resolution to distinguish. 
Admittedly, both states were technically independent at the time 
that they entered the Union. Neither had ratified the Constitu-
tion on June 21, 1788-the date on which, by its terms, the Con-
stitution went into effect by virtue of ratification by New Hamp-
shire, the ninth state to give its assent. Indeed, both states 
31. ld. at 88. 
32. !d. at 96. 
33. ld. 
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initially rejected the Constitution-Rhode Island by popular ref-
erendum on March 2434 and North Carolina by a vote in the 
state ratification convention on August 2.35 Thus, both states 
were at least technically independent until state conventions ul-
timately ratified the new Constitution on May 29, 1790,36 and 
November 21, 1789, respectively. 37 
Nonetheless, the situation of North Carolina and Rhode Is-
land was dramatically different from that of Texas. Both North 
Carolina and Rhode Island had been signatories to the Articles 
of Confederation, and (although Rhode Island sent no delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention) both were among the states 
originally invited to join the new government created by the 
Constitution.38 Thus, the federal goverrunent had no occasion to 
choose between the treaty power and the power to admit new 
states. Instead, no Congressional action was necessary for these 
states to enter the Union. 
The admission of Vermont raised more complex issues.39 
Vermont was in fact an independent republic at the time that it 
was admitted to the Union by an act of Congress on March 4, 
1791. Although Vermonters fought against the British during the 
Revolutionary War, the goverrunent of Vermont had not been a 
party to the Articles of Confederation, had not been represented 
at the Constitutional Convention, and had not been invited by 
Congress to ratify the Constitution in 1787. Indeed, at one time 
Vermont explored the possibility of negotiating a separate peace 
with the British and even reentering the British Empire. 
At the same time, Vermont had always been considered to 
be within the territorial limits of the United States and was rec-
ognized as such by the Treaty of Paris, which brought a formal 
end to the Revolutionary War in 1783. The goverrunent of the 
republic was created in 1775 by a group of settlers who, begin-
ning in 1760, had occupied land that had initially been granted to 
the colony of New York. For almost the entire period between 
the formation of the Republic of Vermont and the admission of 
34. 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST 
SPEECHES, ARTICLES AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 1066 
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
35. !d. at 1068-69. 
36. !d. at 1074. 
3 7. !d. at 1072. 
38. !d. at 935-36,939. 
39. The circumstances surrounding the admission of Vermont are described in de-
tail in the essays in A MORE PERFECT UNION: VERMONT BECOMES A STATE, 1777-1816 
(Michael Sherman ed., 1991). 
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Vermont to the Union, New York claimed that the breakaway 
republic in fact remained part of New York. This claim, together 
with territorial disputes between Vermont and both New Hamp-
shire and Massachusetts, was primarily responsible for the fail-
ure of Vermont to become a state under the Articles of Confed-
eration. The admission of Vermont as a state under the 
Constitution came almost immediately after Vermont had paid 
New York thirty thousand dollars to abandon its claim in 1791. 
Moreover, the situation of Vermont had been a focal point 
of the Convention during the drafting of Article IV, Section 3. 
As originally proposed by Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, 
this section would have provided that "no new State shall be 
erected within the limits of any of the present States, without the 
consent of the Legislature of such State."40 Luther Martin ob-
jected that this language would have allowed Vermont "[to] be 
reduced by force in favor of the States claiming it[.]"41 While 
Martin's proposal to deal with the problem was rejected by the 
Convention, other delegates had similar concerns. "[T]o save 
Vermont ... from a dependence on the consent of N[ew] York," 
William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut moved to amend the 
Morris proposal so that it would read "no new State shall be 
hereafter formed or erected within the limits of any of the pre-
sent States without the consent of the Legislature of such 
State."42 He reasoned that Vermont was already a state, and thus 
his amendment would obviate the need to obtain the consent of 
New York as a precondition for admission to the Union. While 
the Johnson amendment was initially approved by the Conven-
tion, it did not survive in the Committee on Style. 
Ultimately, Morris himself devised the solution to the prob-
lem of Vermont. He proposed to amend his original language so 
that consent would be required only if the new state was within 
the jurisdiction of another state rather than simply within its lim-
its. Morris asserted that, while New York might plausibly claim 
that all or part of Vermont was within its territorial limits, the 
government of New York could not claim jurisdiction over Ver-
mont because Vermont had become a sovereign state. This 
amendment was accepted by a majority of the states43 and ulti-
mately incorporated into the final draft of the Constitution. 
40. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVE:"'TION OF 1787, at 455 (Max Farrand 
ed, rev. ed. 1937) [hereina(tcr RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. 
41. !d. 
42. See id. at 463 (emphasis added to indicate Johnson's addition). 
43. !d. 
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Against this background, the analogy between the admis-
sion of Vermont and the admission of Texas is imperfect at best. 
To be sure, the discussions at the Convention reflected the draft-
ers' belief that Vermont was a sovereign state that was separate 
and independent from the Union that had been created by the 
Articles of Confederation and would be reconfigured by the new 
Constitution. However, at the same time, they saw Vermont as 
part of the same basic territorial unit that comprised the United 
States. Indeed, William Johnson contended that Vermont 
should, if necessary, be compelled to enter the Union.44 Unless 
one accepts the view that Texas was part of the Louisiana Pur-
chase and had never been validly ceded to Spain, the situation of 
Texas was obviously quite different. 
Ultimately, both sides of the controversy appealed directly 
to the language and evolution of Article IV, section 3, Clause 1 
of the Constitution, which states that: 
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; 
but no new State shall be formed or erected with the Jurisdic-
tion of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junc-
tion of two or more states, or Parts of States, without the 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as 
of the Congress. 45 
This formulation differs significantly from the analogous 
provision in the Articles of Confederation, which provided that: 
Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the 
measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and en-
titled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony 
shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be 
d b . 46 agree to y nme states. 
As Madison noted in The Federalist Papers, the language in 
the Articles seemed to encompass only the admission of former 
colonies of Great Britain.47 Nonetheless, even prior to the adop-
tion of the Constitution, Congress had adopted the Northwest 
Ordinance, which looked to the creation of new states in the 
area west of the Alleghenies that had previously been claimed by 
a number of different colonies. In order to deal with this prob-
lem, the Virginia Plan proposed that "provision ought to be 
44. /d. at 456. 
45. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3, cl. 1. 
46. ARTS. OF CON FEDERATION art. XI. 
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274-75 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
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made for the admission of states lawfully arising within the limits 
of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of Gov-
ernment and Territory, or otherwise."48 On June 19, the Conven-
tion agreed to this concept in principle,49 and on August 6, the 
Committee on Detail reported the following clause: 
New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits 
of the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into 
this Government; but to such admission the consent of two 
thirds of the members present in each house shall be neces-
sary. If a new State shall arise within the limits of any of the 
present States, the consent of the Legislatures of such States 
shall be also necessary to its admission. 50 
On August 29, the Convention adopted a substitute proposed by 
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania: "New States may be admit-
ted by the Legislature into the Union: but no new State shall be 
erected within the limits of any of the present States, without the 
consent of the Legislature of such State, as well as of the 
Gen[ eral] Legislature." 51 With only minor alterations, the Mor-
ris language was ultimately incorporated into the Constitution as 
Article IV, Section 3.52 
Supporters of annexation relied on both the text and the 
legislative history of Article IV to support their position. For ex-
ample, Representative Thomas H. Bayly of Virginia asserted the 
following: 
The power [to admit new states] is general, without any other 
limitation than that "no new State shall be formed or created 
within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be 
formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of 
States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States 
concerned as well as of Congress." The imposition of this limi-
tation, upon the most familiar rules of construction, excludes 
the idea of the intention to impose any other. 53 
Annexationists bolstered this argument by noting that the 
original proposal from the Committee on Detail had expressly 
limited the power of Congress to the admission of states estab-
lished within the limits of the United States, while the Morris lan-
48. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 22. 
49. !d. at 322. 
50. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 188. 
51. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 455 (emphasis 
added). 
52. !d. at 464; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
53. Cor-;G. GLOBE, 28thCong., 2d Sess. 102 (1845). 
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guage contained no such limitation. The final language of the 
Constitution is much the same, stating that "New States may be 
admitted by the Congress into this Union" without requiring 
that the states be formed from territory that is already owned by 
the United States government or one of the state governments. 
They reasoned that, because the Convention had considered and 
rejected language that would have limited the Article IV power 
to areas within the territorial limits of the United States, the 
drafters must have believed that the power to admit new states 
was broad enough to encompass situations such as the admission 
of Texas.54 
While this change in language does provide some support 
for the pro-annexation position, other aspects of the debates 
over Article IV suggest the opposite conclusion. The problem 
for the pro-annexation argument is that the Convention also 
considered and rejected language that would have explicitly 
armed Congress with the authority to admit states that were not 
within the preexisting territorial limits of the United States. On 
August 30, Luther Martin of Maryland moved to replace the 
Morris language with a clause which provided in part that "[t]he 
Legislature of the [United States] shall have power to erect New 
States within as well as without the territory claimed by the sev-
eral States or either of them, and admit the same into the Un-
ion. "55 Only the delegations of Maryland, New Jersey, and 
Delaware supported this proposal,56 and Article IV as ultimately 
adopted tracked the Morris formulation. 
Ultimately, it would be a mistake to read too much into ei-
ther the adoption of the Morris formulation or the rejection of 
the Martin language. The goal of the Martin proposal was not to 
clarify the territorial reach of the power to admit new states. 
Rather, it was designed to give Congress the power to divide 
states without the consent of the relevant state legislatures. 57 In-
deed, Martin's general focus was apparently shared by most of 
the delegates to the Convention. With the somewhat ambiguous 
exception of the Vermont situation, the drafters were not think-
ing of the problem of territorial expansion. Instead, the dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention were preoccupied with 
the problem of creating a framework of government that would 
54. /d. at 101. 
55. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 464 (emphasis 
added). 
56. /d. 
57. /d. at 463-M. 
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adequately deal with the problems that were then facing the re-
cently-freed colonies (including their Western possessions). 
Nonetheless, the historical record includes some fragmen-
tary evidence that bears directly on the annexation issue. Some 
annexationists also appealed to the authority of James Madison, 
widely-regarded as the father of the Constitution. For example, 
Representative Joseph A. Woodward of South Carolina noted 
that, in The Federalist Papers, Madison had declared that "the 
immediate object of the constitution was to secure the the [sic] 
Union of the thirteen primitive States, and such States as might 
arise within their bosom or within their neighborhoods. "58 
Woodward and others reasoned that Madison's assertion re-
flected a contemporary understanding that the Union might 
eventually include states formed from territory outside the 
boundaries of the original thirteen colonies, and that the power 
to admit new states must have been drafted with that possibility 
in mind.59 
By contrast, private correspondence between Morris and 
Henry W. Livingston in 1803 points to the opposite conclusion. 
Expressing the view that Louisiana and other foreign territory 
should only be acquired as "provinces [with] no voice in our 
councils," Morris asserted that "[i]n wording the third section of 
the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to 
establish [this principle]. Candor obliges me to add my belief, 
that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition 
would have been made. "60 
For a person who is seeking in good faith to follow the 
original understanding of the Constitution, the Morris letter pre-
sents something of a dilemma. On one hand, the letter is a clear 
expression of the understanding of the man who actually drafted 
the relevant provision-an expression which, since made in pri-
vate, is entirely credible. On the other, the drafter seems to sug-
gest that he made a deliberate effort to obscure the meaning of 
the provision from the other delegates because he realized that, 
if they understood the language as he did, they would oppose the 
provision. Further, Madison's statement in The Federalist sug-
gests that the other delegates did not share Morris's understand-
ing of Article IV. 
58. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1845) (emphasis in original). 
59. /d. 
60. The letter is reproduced in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra 
note 40, at 404. 
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In any event, against this background of conflicting evi-
dence, the results of the presidential election changed the politi-
cal dynamic sufficiently to pave the way for the approval of the 
joint resolution. With the party having succeeded in electing a 
President on a platform that promised annexation, dissident 
Northern Democrats came under pressure to change their posi-
tion. This factor alone was sufficient to guarantee a victory in the 
House of Representatives, which was under Democratic control. 
There, the resolution passed notwithstanding the fact that 
twenty-seven anti-slavery Democrats joined the united Whigs in 
opposition.61 
Supporters of annexation faced a more difficult task in the 
Senate. The Whigs held a slender majority in the lame duck ses-
sion of the Twenty-Eighth Congress that met in early 1845. Thus, 
even assuming that Democratic senators could unite around a 
joint resolution, some Whig support would be necessary for pas-
sage. While Northern Whigs continued their resolute opposition 
to annexation, the election had left their Southern counterparts 
with an uncomfortable political dilemma. Polk's strength in the 
Deep South had demonstrated the appeal of annexation to the 
general populace in the slave states. Moreover, the results of the 
election had guaranteed that Democrats would have a solid ma-
jority in the Senate in the incoming Twenty-Ninth Congress, vir-
tually assuring the eventual success of the annexation move-
ment. Nonetheless, most Whigs continued to stand firmly against 
the joint resolution. However, three Southern Whigs senators 
deserted their party, providing the pro-annexation forces with a 
razor-thin victory by a margin of twenty-seven to twenty-five. 62 
The government of Texas accepted the terms presented to it, 
and Texas officially joined the Union as a state on December 29, 
1845. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In retrospect, the practical impact of constitutional argu-
ments on the debate over the annexation of Texas appears to 
have been negligible. The depth and sophistication of the consti-
tutional analysis was often extremely impressive. Nonetheless, 
the evidence does not suggest that the arguments actually 
61. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 372 (1845). 
62. !d. at 362. For a general discussion of the political dilemma faced by Southern 
Whigs, see MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE Ar-iD FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: 
JACKSONIAN POLITICS Ai'<D THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 218-21 (2003). 
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changed any votes. The members of the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate do not seem to have developed their posi-
tions on the constitutional issues based on "neutral," distinc-
tively legal principles; instead, they chose the constitutional 
positions that would support their predetermined political views. 
The debate over the annexation of Texas is by no means 
unique in this regard. For example, John C. Calhoun could 
hardly have believed that Northern senators and representatives 
who were committed to the position that slavery should be ex-
cluded from the Mexican cession would be converted to the 
Southern view by his argument that such exclusion would be un-
constitutional.63 Conversely, there is no indication that congres-
sional support for the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was in any way 
weakened by those who argued that the provisions of the statute 
violated the constitutional rights of putative escapees.64 None-
theless, appeals to the Constitution played an important role in 
creating the political climate surrounding the debate over these 
Issues. 
Throughout our history, most Americans have viewed the 
Constitution as far more than a simple collection of legal rules. 
Instead, the document is also seen as the repository of the most 
fundamental values underlying the structure of the American 
government and society more generally. Thus, when opponents 
label a policy "unconstitutional," they are in effect expressing 
the view that the policy is not only wrongheaded, but is inimical 
to those values. This claim has the effect of both exhorting op-
ponents to use their strongest efforts to defeat the policy, and of 
signaling the supporters of the policy that the opposition views 
implementation of the policy as an ongoing threat to the stability 
of the system as a whole, and that the opposition is therefore 
unlikely to be defused by the ordinary process of political ac-
commodation and compromise. Plainly, those who invoked the 
Constitution in opposition to the annexation of Texas saw the 
issue in just such terms. Whigs in general emphasized the desta-
bilizing effect of annexation generally, and Northern opponents 
asserted that the addition of such a vast territory in which slav-
ery was tolerated would upset the delicate political balance be-
tween North and South upon which amicable relations between 
the sections depended-particularly since the joint resolution 
63. For Calhoun's argument, see CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 455 (1846). 
64. For an excellent example of the argument against the constitutionality of the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, see HORACE MANN, SLAVERY: LEITERS AND SPEECHES 
299-3ll4 (B. B. Musey & Co. 1853). 
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provided that Texas could be divided into as many as five states. 
Subsequent events demonstrated that these concerns were far 
from insubstantial; while annexation did not result in the imme-
diate disruption of the Union, it set in motion a series of events 
that ultimately led to the Civil War. 65 Thus, while the constitu-
tional arguments against annexation may not have been compel-
ling in purely legal terms, the fears that underlay those argu-
ments were ultimately vindicated. 
65. The best account of these events is DAVID M. POTIER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 
1848-1861 (1976). 
